LoBiondo's And Mica's Statements At Hearing On 9/11 Commission's Recommendations
Washington, D.C. - The following comments were made at the U.S. House Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Subcommittee after opening statements at the Subcommittee hearing on the 9/11 Commission's recommendations for improving maritime transportation security:
Chairman Frank LoBiondo (R-NJ)The Subcommittee is meeting this afternoon to review the findings and recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and to examine the current state of security of our maritime transportation system.
The horrible events that occurred on September 11, 2001 had a profound impact on the lives of all Americans, including the intense loss still felt by so many families in my home state of New Jersey. In order to prevent future terrorist attacks on this Nation, we must as elected representatives learn from the events of that day and the circumstances that conspired to make such events possible. By meeting today to discuss the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, we are taking a step further toward establishing measures that will protect the security of the American people.
As members of this subcommittee, we are specifically charged with overseeing the security of the maritime sector. The 9/11 Commission's report alludes to the fact that ports and maritime transportation industries may be particularly vulnerable to a future terrorist attack. The introduction of a dirty bomb or a large amount of explosives into one of our ports could have catastrophic effects not only to the safety of the many Americans living in coastal areas but could effectively halt the global transport of goods and materials.
In order to ensure security at our ports and along our coasts, we must focus our attention on improving the Coast Guard's capabilities to prevent future attacks. The Coast Guard has been and continues to be the lead agency responsible for protecting homeland security along this Nation's shores.
On September 11th, the Coast Guard played a vital role in coordinating the evacuation of nearly one million people by boat from harm's way in lower Manhattan. After September 11th, the Coast Guard quickly incorporated additional maritime homeland security responsibilities with the many missions that the Service carries out each and every day. The men and women of the Coast Guard should be commended for the speed and skill with which they have accomplished this feat.
Nevertheless, I believe that there are many measures that we can take to improve our awareness of activities occurring in the maritime domain. The Coast Guard has identified maritime domain awareness as one of its major objectives. It is our job to ensure the Service has the necessary resources, technology and authority to achieve this objective to better secure America's ports and the maritime transportation sector.
The Commission's report includes a number of recommendations that call for a system-wide improvement in the national intelligence community so that we may improve the quantity, quality and integration of information that is being collected. We must focus energy and resources to increase our intelligence capabilities on the high seas and in overseas ports. Increased intelligence efforts in the maritime sector will allow the Coast Guard to further push out our borders, allowing the service to identify and track potential threats at a distance from our shores. We must be able to verify the list of ports previously called on by vessels approaching U.S. ports. We must also enhance our capabilities to both identify the individuals or groups that control interests in both the vessel and the cargo carried aboard the vessel and track the long range movement of those vessels. Enhancing the collection and dissemination of maritime intelligence data is critical if the Coast Guard is to successfully secure America's ports.
Like the Coast Guard, this Committee has been given increased responsibilities in overseeing the security of the maritime sector following September 11th. I believe that we have met this challenge. This Committee worked hard to enact two unprecedented pieces of legislation that have for the first time imposed a state of security in the maritime transportation sector. We are beginning to see the results of the Maritime Transportation Security Act today, with the boarding and inspections of thousands of foreign and domestic vessels and the security improvements being implemented at our ports. However, security needs are continually being identified and further refined, and we must continue to develop legislation to address emerging needs. I am interested to hear testimony today from our witnesses as to what they see as critical areas that remain to be addressed.
Finally, I would like to echo the sentiments that have been so often directed to yourselves and the other members of the Commission. You and your staff are to be commended for the bipartisan manner in which this report both recounts the occurrence of events on that day and recommends measures to prevent future attacks.
Chairman John Mica's (R-FL)
Today's hearing will focus on the 9/11 Commission Report and in particular the aviation security recommendations. As we all know, the 9/11 Commission Members and staff completed their review of the events that led up to September 11th. And they have made numerous recommendations, including recommendations that relate specifically to aviation.
The Report is an important part of our ongoing efforts to improve an aviation security system that was so easily used for devastating terrorist acts. In fact, as stated in the Commission Report, "By 8:00 A.M. on the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001, they [the terrorists] had defeated all the security layers that America's civil aviation security system had in place to prevent a hijacking."
The failures on September 11th were numerous. There were many opportunities to discover the terrorist plot. There were also opportunities to prevent the completion of their plans.
Some of the terrorists lived in the United States for over a year. During that time:
- They obtained visas and traveled extensively around the globe, including in and out of the United States;
- They completed financial transactions, rented apartments, paid utilities and school fees, and purchased airline tickets and other items;
- They obtained driver's licenses, social security I.D's, and frequent flyer cards;
- They received training at U.S. flight schools;
- They put down deposits for flight simulators, where some of them ominously expressed great interest in flying a large aircraft and less interest in landing the aircraft; and
- They were granted pilot certificates.
- They were stopped by police and airport screeners.
During this time and well before, the terrorists also researched, analyzed, observed and then tested how to overcome the existing airport security screening requirements.
Quite simply, the 19 hijackers were able to defeat all layers of aviation security on 9/11.
The Commission Report provides a detailed description of how they were able to overcome our security system:
- They got through the aviation security checkpoint system. There is evidence that they knew what size knife blade was permissible. There is also evidence that they were able to carry mace onto their flights.
- They beat the CAPPS pre-screening program. While half of the 9/11 hijackers were "selected" by CAPPS and an airline employee "flagged" two additional hijackers, this only meant that their checked bags were not loaded on the aircraft until they had boarded. It did not impact the level of screening received by the hijackers or their carry-on bags.
- They exploited the pre-9/11 flight crew training. Prior to September 11th, flight crews were trained to cooperate and not resist in the event of a hijacking. A suicide hijacking was not considered. This failure allowed the hijackers to control the crew and passengers on all but Flight 93.
- They hid the location of the hijacked planes. The terrorists discontinued radio contact and turned off the transponders on three of the four hijacked aircraft. The FAA could still track the aircraft with some difficulty. However, FAA air traffic controllers "lost" at least three of the aircraft for varying periods of time on 9/11.
- They took advantage of poor planning and communication. Joint FAA and military planning did not contemplate a suicide hijacking. In addition, as the hijackings were occurring, communication was confused and information was not shared across the Government. Even within the FAA, the four air traffic control centers and FAA Headquarters did not have the same information.
"As one witness recalled, "[It] was almost like there were parallel decision making processes going on;...[In] my mind they were competing venues for command and control and decision making."
Clearly, aviation security was not prepared for the events of September 11, 2001. However, much has been improved since that time. We now have tougher screening requirements; Federal Air Marshals; hardened cockpit doors; Armed Federal Flight Deck Officers; improved flight crew training; and of course a more alert and cautious traveling public.
But there is still room for improvement. The 9/11 Commission has provided recommendations on ways to further improve aviation security.
This Committee has been at the forefront of strengthening aviation security over the last three years. Several of the Commission's recommendations complement our ongoing efforts, including:
- Better planning with clearly defined roles, responsibilities and command structures, and improved communications among Federal, State and local agencies and the aviation industry;
- A layered security approach;
- Passenger pre-screening carried out by the Federal government based upon an integrated watch list;
- The establishment of a common biometrics standard and the use of biometrics technologies to identify and stop known terrorists and to confirm the identity of all travelers.
- Continued improvements in passenger, baggage and cargo screening, with priority placed on the detection of explosives carried on the person and the development of technology to effectively and efficiently conduct cargo screening.
The information, analysis and recommendations contained in the 9/11 Commission Report can be most helpful in moving a number of pending security reforms forward. Hopefully, the Commission Report will help propel long overdue aviation security policies through the political process as Congress returns in September.
Therefore, I appreciate everyone's participation in this important hearing today. I want to thank Commissioner Lehman, Admiral Stone, and the industry and labor representatives for their contributions to today's discussion. We look forward to your testimony.